Sustainable development and North-South trade by Chichilnisky, Graciela
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Sustainable development and
North-South trade
Graciela Chichilnisky
1998
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/8894/
MPRA Paper No. 8894, posted 29 May 2008 04:11 UTC
PROTECTION OF GLOBAL BIODIVERSITY
Converging Strategies
Lakshinan D. Guruswamy and Jeffrey A. McNeely, editors
Duke University Press
	
Durham and London >998
Sustainable Development and
North-South Trade
by Graciela Chichilnisky
The present acceleration of environmental destruction can be linked to the eco-
nomic trading strategies that carne into vogue after World War 11 . The theory of
comparative advantages of trade, which recommends that developing countries
enlpllasize resource exports and exports of labor-intensive products, has proven
devastating to both the economies and environments of Latin America and Africa .
In contrast, the Asian Tigers approach based on external ecorlornies of scale, 1115
generated knowledge-intensive products where benefits spread across whole in-
dustries and whole economies, leading to more econonlic growth with much less
environmental degradation . Such an approach should be promoted tllrougllout
the world trading system instead of the resource-intensive patterns of growth that
continue to threaten our global environment . This is particularly important
because other resource-conserving strategies, such as green accounting and prop-
erty rights regimes, remain politically unattainable .
The Global Environment Today
I human beings, or their close genetical relatives, have lived on earth for several ynil-
lion years . Yet it is only recently that human activity has reached levels at which it
can affect fundamental natural processes, such as the concentration of gases (chlo-
rofluorocarbon, or crc, and (;oz ) in the atmosphere of the planet, and the complex
web of species that constitute life on earth. There is considerable uncertainty
about the magnitude and impact of the changes that huynankind is causing, but it
is known that industrial activity has, for the first time in history, reached levels at
which it call liter the planet's atmosphere and destroy its biodiversity. Incidents of
destruction of particular species are recorded ; however, the overall destruction of
biodiversity on the playlet is not (Kalin, Raven, and Sarukllan 1992) . Some fear that
llunlanity's survival may be at stake .
TI1e June 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro underscored this concern . In the
United Nation's Agenda 21,15o nations explicitly recommended new development
patterns based o11 the satisfaction of basic needs, a concept created and developed
within the Bariloche model (Chichilnisky 1977x; Herrera, Scolnik, and Chichil-
nisky 1976). The summit chose three major areas in which concerted international
action is urgently needed : biodiversity, climate change, and sustainable develop-
nlent. Two Framework Conventions were assigned the task of designing interna-
tional policies that call avert damage in these areas . The areas are so closely con-
nected as to be inseparable in real as well as conceptual terms.
Biodiversity cannot be seen in isolation, and the threats to biodiversity must be
contextualized within the patterns of economic development . Most biodiversity
loss is due to habitat destruction, for example through deforestation. Deforesta-
tion, in turn, is mostly due to the transformation of forested areas into agricultural
sites for growing cash crops, or for exploring and extracting resources such as pe-
troleunl .'F11e driving force behind most biodiversity loss is economic development
based on the exploitation and intensive use of natural resources.
Often the exploitation of resources is for trade in the international market . Pe-
troleum exploitation in the Amazon basin and copper extraction in Chile are good
examples, and so are most cash crops grown in Central and South America and in
Africa, such as sugar, coffee, and soya and palm oil .
This chapter examines the problem from a North-South perspective, focusing
on patterns of trade between industrial and developing nations . It suggests pat-
terns of sustainable economic development that are in harmony with the earth's
resources . In the last So years, industrial society has developed a voracious appetite
for the earth's resources, and in the midst of its "golden age," it is starting to bite its
own tail .
Major changes in our understanding of economic (level opine lit are needed to
ensure the preservation of the world's remaining resources and its biodiversity .
Economic development is not about doing more with more, but rather, doing
more with Icss .
Major Concerns and Little Action
Three years have passed since the Framework Conventions were charged with their
task at Rio's Earth Summit, but little action has been taken so far. Two major factors
hinder the negotiations . The first is the differing perceptions of global environmen-
tal problems by industrial and developing countries. A second contributing factor is
that our scientific knowledge of global environmental issues is poor.
Global environmental problems are relatively new; because they are global in
nature, traditional physical sciences are ill-equipped for understanding them .
Ilowever, scientific uncertainty about physical phenomena should not by itself
detain the negotiations . After all, one often assumes decisions under uncer-
tainty ; in this case, under scientific uncertainty. It is the first problem-North-
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TABLE I
	
Share of Total World Carbon Dioxide Emissions, Population, and (;NP
Industrial and Less-developed Countries 1986
Sources : Author's calculations are based on Susan Subak, Accounting for Climate Change (Stockholm :
Stockholm Environmental Research Institute, 199o).
South differences-that hinders the negotiations . This point was underscored at a
conference of the pat- ties in Berlin in April 1995 . The North-South differences go to
the root of the global environmental problem, and lead us to question fundamen-
tal issues about economic development, international trade, and the distribution
and use of resources on the planet.
North-South Issues
Developing countries view global environmental issues in a historical perspective,
and observe that most of the damage to the global environment originates in tile in-
dustrial countries . The industrial countries, for obvious geographical reasons, are
called the North . For the same reasons, the developing countries are called the South .
Greenhouse gas emissions are a prime example. Carbon emissions arise front
the use of energy : the more energy that is used, the more carbon that is emitted .
Energy consumption is proportional to the level of production, and most produc-
tion takes place in the developed countries of the North, which house about 20
percent of the world's population.'Iable 1 shows that 70 percent of the world's cot
and most of the CFCS are emitted by the industrialized countries, which have also
substantially altered their biomass. In per capita terms, the emission of carbon is to
times greater in industrial counties than in developing countries . Therefore, the
North consumes most of the energy produced in the world .
By contrast, most of the biodiversity and forests remaining on the planet are in
the South, home to most of the planet's people as well . The developing countries
account for four-fifths of the total world population . From the perspective of de-
veloping countries, the North is fundamentally responsible for tile current situa-
tion, and nothing short of changing the North's pattern of development and envi-
ronmental use can change matters . The problem, of course, is that restricting
emissions requires restricting energy use and output . Therefore, the North must
decrease its use of resources to make a dent in the problem .
Industrial countries have a different perspective on global environmental prob-
lems : they focus not on the past or present, but on a long-run future . They fear
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Industrial 70% 6o% 23% 84%
Less developed 3000 40% 77910 160o'
rapid population growth in developing countries and (lie damage that this could
eventually produce on tile environment . China and India, countries with enor-
mously large populations and fast growth rates, also have large coal deposits . As
their industrial growth proceeds, they are expected to burn coal and emit carbon
into the atmosphere in substantial amounts. In the case of China, generally ac-
cepted projections indicate that it could approximate U.S . levels of carbon ends-
sions in about half a century. /1t present, the United States emits around 25 percent
of all carbon emissions and consumes approximately 25 percent of all petroleum
produced, even though it contains less than 5 percent of the world's population .
Replicating such a pattern could potentially predicate disaster.
Much rhetoric has focused on population growth as a source of environmental
problems. In a sense, the issue is real : without humans, the problem that concerns
us today would not exist . It is incorrect, however, to blame matters on population
growth . Those regions of the world that have the lowest population growth,
namely the North, account for most of the damage to the global environment.
While this trend could, of course, be reversed in the future, global environmental
damage has so far not been related to population growth .
Overconsumption and Overproduction
The world's energy use, and the concomitant use of the atmosphere to absorb car-
bon emissions, is symptomatic of a larger problem : the use of natural resources as
a whole. Most exhaustible resources, such as minerals, and most of the renewable
ones, such as wood and the agricultural products obtained from fertile land, are
consumed in the North. To a large extent, most of these resources are overpro-
duced in and then exported from the South . In fact, two-thirds of all Latin Amer-
ican exports are resources .
The interrelated overconsumption and overproduction of fossil fuel, for exam-
ple, can be described as a North-South process. Most carbon emissions originate
from the burning of fossil fuel, which is generally exported by developing coun-
tries to industrialized ones. Further, industrialized countries consume 16o giga-
joules of fossil fuel per person as compared to 17 gigajoules per person in develop-
ing countries . For aluminum, the figure is 16 to 2; for copper, 16 to i ; and for beef
and veal, 27 to 4.5 (wtr1, UNEP, and UNDP 1995) .
The most prominent fossil fuel is petroleum, and its overproduction and over-
consumption clearly implicates the international market . The general consensus is
that the world's rapid rate of consumption of fossil fuels is linked to low petroleum
prices : the lower the price, the higher the consumption . Petroleum prices in the
United States are 2 .5 to 3 times lower than those paid by the German and Japanese
consumer. Corresponding to this, the United States uses petroleum much less ef-
ficiently than Japan and Germany: a unit ofGDP in the United States has approxi-
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mately a qo percent higher petroleum content . The United States imports its pe-
troleum from Latin America-Mexico, Venezuela, and Ecuador-despite the fact
that about ao percent of the recoverable petroleum deposits in the world are in
North America .
While this North-South pattern of resource use has been known for some tune,
it has not been considered a problem until recently ; in fact, many economists view
this pattern as a manifestation of the efficient functioning of markets .
What is less clear is how this situation of overproduction and overconsumption
beyond the point of sustainability evolved . Many of its have been considering this
question for the last zo years.' But it seems fair to say that many have not thought
about this question often, because it does not fit easily with traditional economic
views of the world, and in particular, the standard vision of economic develop-
rnent and international trade based on resource-intensive exports by developing
countries .
Economic Causes and Ecological Consequences
The environmental question is difficult because it falls in the gap joining several
different disciplines : economics, biology, and earth sciences . In simple terms, the
causes of the phenomenon that we face are economic: we destroy biodiversity and
its habitat, the forests, for economic reasons . For example, 9o percent of the defor-
estation that takes place in the tropics, which house 6o to 70 percent of the world's
biodiversity, is to the land to grow cash crops, most of which are for the interna-
tional market. 'File Amazon forest is being cleared in Ecuador for the exploration
and extraction of petroleum by U.S . companies, despite protests from indigenous
people ; oil accounts for 5o percent of Ecuador's exports . In Brazil, the Amazon for-
est is used as a source of wood, such as mahogany, of which 50 percent is exported
to Britain ; it is also cleared to grow coffee and soybeans, again for international
market . The Korup forest between Cameroon and Nigeria-at 6o million years
old, the oldest forest in Africa-is used as a source of palm oil, also sold in the in-
ternational market. Therefore, although the causes are economic, the results are
biological and physical .
This often means that one discipline-economics-observes the causes, and
others-such as biology and geophysics-observe the results . Yet each misses a cru-
cial side of the equation . One can only deal with the global environmental dilemrria
by looking at both sides of the equation . This requires interdisciplinary cooperation,
a subject that does not come easily in our traditional university system .
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The Postwar World Order
Why is it that after millions of years on the planet, humans now perceive a global
environmental crisis that could threaten tile species survival? I-lave matters really
changed in recent years?
Most scientists now agree that they have, and they give a date for the onset of
today's global environmental problems . The last 5o years are seen as the period
when most of the damage to the planet's biodiversity and the change in atmos-
pheric concentration of greenhouse gases has occurred . There is wide agreement
that the emission level of greenhouse gases in the past half decade has exceeded tile
extent of emissions in recorded history. Indeed, biologists claim that today's dev-
astation is only comparable to four or five main incidents of global biodiversity
destruction, such as the fall of a meteorite held to be responsible for tile disap-
pearance of the dinosaurs . What happened fifty years ago?
Fifty years ago, World War II was won by the Allies . For the first time, the United
States of America, which led the victory, dominated the world economy, produc-
ing qo percent of the world's products as a consequence of the war's destruction of
the Japanese and European economies . Today, the United States is back to a much
lower level, approximately 25 percent of the world economy measured in terms of
the Gross National Product (GNP) .
After the war was won, a new world order emerged with its norms punctuated
by the creation of four major international organizations : tile United Nations, tile
International Monetary Fund (IMF), tile World Bank (wri), and the General Agree-
ment oil Trade and 'Iariffs (GATT) . These organizations follo%ved and implemented
the leading country's vision of economic growth : an extremely resource-intensive
growth corresponding to a rapidly expanding frontier economy, with an enor-
mous consumption of resources, and the domination of nature through rapid
technological change.
In the last 50 years since the end of the war, the world has grown at a rapid pace.
Yet, international trade has grown much faster : in fact, three times faster than the
overall growth of the world economy during the same period .
At tile same time that these four major international organizations were created
to implement a new world order, two major theories of trade and growth were de-
veloped and implemented . One was the neoclassical theory of optimal economic
growth, originated in the United States, which views as a long-run steady state
a path of development with exponential rates of population growth and cor-
respondingly exponential increases in the use of resources . This theory ascribes to
unlimited expansion in terms of the economy and of its use of resources, parallel-
ing the pattern of development in the United States . The second economic theory
was complementary to the first, and originated in Sweden, although it was also
widely applied and developed in the United States . This is the theory of compara-
tive advantages in international trade, which recommends that developing coun-
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tries emphasize resource exports and exports of labor-intensive products, and in
turn, trade these for capital- and technology-intensive products produced by the
industrial countries . The vision of development that these theories advanced was
one based on unlimited and inexpensive resources . Even today, this view is preva-
lent in the United States : inexpensive oil is seen as the basis for healthy economic
growth, almost a birthright of its citizens, a right for which wars can be, and are,
fought . Any rational attempt to redress this view meets with political failure .
These two theories of growth and trade, which have prevailed since the 1950s,
have had major implications for the way we use and trade resources. These theories
were implemented by international organizations such as the wB and IMr, both of
which provided strong incentives to developing countries to follow resource-inten-
sive development patterns, and recommended exporting more and more resource-
intensive products as a precondition for loans and other important economic in-
centives . At least as important, economists and civil servants from developing
countries under the influence of the United States were imbued with a sense of fi-
nality in the way things are : developing countries are only good for resources, cash
crops, and cheap labor products . This proposition is largely uncontested today in
Latin America and Africa, the two areas that have fallen behind in terms of eco-
nomic growth over the past two decades . It underscores the heavily resource-inten-
sive patterns of production and exports in these two regions .
Why do developing countries overproduce and overexport resource-intensive
products such as cash crops, which require extensive land clearing, and minerals such
as petroleum, which also affect the health of many forested areas? Why do develop-
ing countries export environment-intensive products at prices below the social costs?
Is it true that developing countries have a comparative advantage in environment-
intensive products, such as cash crops, minerals, and dirty industry, which use clean
air intensively? If so, doesn't efficiency dictate that this comparative advantage be ex-
ploited, and shouldn't this lead to everyone's gain? In sum, is there a fundamental
contradiction between economic gain and environmental preservation?
The answer to this latter question is "no," and it leads to a new theory of why
countries trade (Chichilnisky 1994x, 159-69; 1994b) . All this is found by analyzing
the behavior of competitive international markets, taking into account important
institutions, such as property rights for common property environmental re-
sources, which are typically different in industrial and developing countries .
Property Rights and International Trade
Before industrialization, many traditional societies had long managed their con1-
mon property resources, such as fisheries and forests, using various forms of local
governance. Common property is a term that refers to shared group ownership,
rather than individual ownership. An example is Valencia's Tribunal de las Aguas,
Sustainable Development and Trade
	
107
a local 1,ooo-year-old Spanish court, which still meets today on a weekly basis to
administer costs and allocate the use of the region's water network . Other exam-
ples are the Iriaichi system of managing common lands in Japan, and Bahia's sys-
tem of sea tenure in northeastern Brazil (Chicllilnisky 1994b) . These traditional
systems, however, require a population that is both stable-in the sense that suc-
cessive generations remain in the same area-and not too large-so that penal-
ties from antisocial use of resources can be administered effectively and, if neces-
sary, across generations (Stone, this volume) .
Such systems of resource management tend to break down during periods of
industrialization, when outsiders move into the common property area, and can
easily move out to avoid penalties . During the process of industrialization, then,
populations become large, mobile, and unaccountable. Well-managed common
property is treated as unmanaged "open access" resources, which can be had for
the taking. A "first come, first serve" system prevails.
In ninny of the now-industrialized countries, industrialization was preceded by
the privatization of common property resources. For example, in the United King-
dom, industrialization was proceeded by a major change in property rights : the
privatization of the commons. With large and mobile populations, private prop-
erty regimes often work better in the conservation of local resources than do com-
mon property regimes; the privatization of oil ill the United States, the "I lot Oil
Act" of 1936, is an example. The United States extracts little oil conrl)ared with the
levels of extraction in developing countries with less well-defined property rights
on this resource, such as Mexico. This is true even though the United States has
enormous deposits, while Mexico does not." The fact that the United States uses its
local oil resources more carefully, however, does not mean that it consumes less oil :
the difference between production and consumption is made ill) by imports, and
the United States economy is today the largest single importer of oil ill the world.
Why do property rights matter? When a pool from which a resource is ex-
tracted, such as a forest or a lake, is treated as open access, only the cost of actually
extracting the resource, such as a tree or fish, is computed . The responsibility for
the cost of managing the system, which is often substantial, is not computed . In
such cases, noncooperative systems of exploitation emerge : at each market price,
more is extracted under open access regimes than under traditional managed sys-
terrrs or private property regimes. The resource is overextracted, ill(] Carl dwindle
or even disappear (Dasgupta and Heal 1979 ; Chichilnisky 1994b) .
Private goods are goods whose consumption is rival, in the sense that what one
person consumes, others cannot. Furthermore, the levels of consumption can be
chosen independently by each person . Examples of private goods are eatable prod-
ucts . Public goods differ from private goods ill that they are available to everyone
in about the same amount, and within limits, are not rival in consunllition-for
example, a road, a bridge, or an army . Moreover, with public goods, one person's
1o8
	
Graciela Chichilnisky
consumption need not detract from others'. A good example is knowledge : one
may share knowledge with others without losing it oneself. (Of course, knowledge
should not be identified with the financial gains that can be obtained from it.)
Classic public goods are supplied by governments . Biodiversity or greenhouse
gas concentrations in the atmosphere are public goods, but not in the classical
sense . They are produced by each individual in the economy, rather than by gov-
ernments. For example, carbon emissions are "produced" by each person or firm
privately when they drive their cars or burn fossil fuels to release energy. These are
private activities that a government does not generally regulate .
The trading of private goods is very different from the trading of public goods .
In markets with private goods, efficiency is divorced from equity in the sense that
under any distribution of property rights, a competitive market with private goods
achieves an efficient outcome at a market equilibrium . This is not true in markets
with public goods . In such markets, there is a relation between efficiency and eq-
uity. A rigorous, general equilibrium treatment of markets in which some of the
goods are private, and others are privately produced public goods, such as prop-
erty rights on emission of carbon dioxide, is in Chichilnisky 1994x, Chichilnisky
and Heal 1994, and Chichilnisky, Heal, and Starrett 1993 . These papers show that
certain property rights regimes on the use of global environmental goods are con-
sistent with the efficient operation of competitive markets, and others are not . n
certain "equity" is needed for environmental markets to operate efficiently.
It has been shown that if a traditional economy treats a pool from which a nat-
ural resource is extracted as open access, then at each market price it will offer
more of the resource, leading to an apparent comparative advantage in resource-
intensive products even where there is none . More resource-intensive products
will be produced at each market price than is socially optimal . III particular, more
is available for export at each price .
A typical example of this phenomenon emerges in societies where resources are
unregulated, national property effectively treated as open access . Besides apparent
comparative advantages, it also leads to apparent gains from trade, even in cases
where they are losses . For example, Honduras exports mahogany to the United
States even though it his no comparative advantage in wood products . Mexico ex-
ports petroleum to the United States even though it has small reserves .
Resource-intensive products are exported at prices that are below social costs .
'I'11ey are overconsurned by the countries with well-defined property rights and
overproduced by those with ill-defined property rights . Moreover, export coun-
tries do not compute the cost of replacing the stock of trees harvested for wood or
the cost of the depleted resource in a case of oil . Finally, the world economy as a
whole consumes an inefficient quantity of resources, because it does not take into
account the costs to the world economy of the resource overuse .
It is remarkable that all this happens even while markets are perfectly cornpeti-
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tive . Of course, monopolistic practices may exist, but we need not invoke them in
any way to explain these inefficient patterns of consumption, production, and
trade. The overuse of resources, and the inefficient market solutions just de-
scribed, do not derive from market imperfections . Rattler, they derive from a de-
fective system of property rights as the world economy moves away froill tradi-
tional forms of resource management into irldustr- i .11 societies . 'I'lle process of
industrialization itself leads to the patterns of North-South trade that we observe,
and that are at the core of the environmental dilenlnla today.
Green Accounting
A proposal currently being considered by the United Nations would modify the
system of national accounts followed by all countries to formally incorporate en-
vironmental costs . Green accounting is the practice of deducting environmental
costs from the computation of the cnr. For example, the national accounts would
depreciate the value of the stock of forests or minerals extracted, much in the same
way that private individuals and firms depreciate the value of their own stock
when reporting their personal or corporate income.
Green accounting can indeed help to reduce the overuse of resources, as well as
excessive extraction and trade, by correcting the miscalculation described above . It
call make a large difference in reporting economic perforillalice based on ci)r in
resource-intensive countries . For example, the c;r~rs of Costa Rica and Mexico
were recomputed using this practice, and dropped to a fraction of their former
level as computed by standard practices .
Green accounting can only help indirectly, however, by deducting the deprecia-
tion of the stock of exhaustible resource or the cost of replacing the stock of re-
newable resources from the (;r)r . It is all indirect mechanism in that it call only in-
duce growth-oriented politicians to follow more environmentally sound policies
if they perceive their political target as the maximization of national economic
growth . If a politician's reelection depends on the measure of national economic
growth, and it often does, Green accounting could be helpful in reorienting envi-
ronmental policy.
The Asian Tigers, Latin America, and Africa
After disclosing the negative impact that North-South trade Ills had oil the global
environment, the natural question that arises is whether a solution can be found
that does not conflict with free markets . Some policynlakers, for exarllple, advise
import substitutions, tariffs, or other practices that restrict trade. It is true that in
emergencies, a ban oil the trade of certain species that are close to extinction may
be necessary: examples include trade in elephant tusks, tigers, and more recently,
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in the United States, box turtles. Humans' irrational cruelty to animals admits on
occasion to no other redress .'I11e problem, however, goes beyond the restriction of
animal trade: the overexploitation of minerals and forestlands inflicts damage not
only to their producers, but also to their consumers .
Yet it is possible to reorient patterns of trade and development without hindering
or interfering with international trade (Chichilnisky 1992) . A positive example of
such a strategy is offered by the Asian Tigers, while Latin America and Africa serve
as negative examples . The former are export oriented, but have moved swiftly away
from traditional comparative advantages-such as labor-intensive and resource-
intensive products-into knowledge-intensive products . Such products include
microprocessors, consumer electronics, financial products, and other sophisticated,
technology-based products . The terns economies of scale refers to the fact that such
products are produced more efficiently at larger scale levels . Ail example is provided
by the well-known concept of "learning by doing," where the more one produces,
the more productive one becomes . This means that their prices drop as their sup-
ply increases: a typical case of economies of scale is the computer industry.
External economies ofscale is a term used to characterize production processes
where efficiency gains at larger scales are not restricted to one firth . They are, in-
stead, distributed throughout the whole industry or economy. In other words: the
more that is produced, the more productive all producers are. Such external
economies of scale are typical of industries that require knowledge as an impor-
tant input . For instance, a better-trained labor force benefits all firms, not just one
of them . Knowledge diffuses across a whole industry. Examples include electronic
products, hardware and software, biotechnology, and electronic-based services
such as data communication, consumer electronics, and financial services, all of
which are based on knowledge. These are the most dynamic sectors in the world
economy today.
An important aspect of external economies of scale is that they are not con-
nected with monopolistic behavior, require neither large capital outlays nor large-
sized plants . To the contrary, external economies of scale typically occur in indus-
tries with many competitive firms .
The type of skilled labor required for industries with external economies of
scale is available in many developing countries. Mexico is currently a producer of
electronic products such as microchips and software ; India is becoming one of the
largest exporters of software in the world, having produced the software that man-
ages the entire United Kingdom train system . Since software production is labor
intensive, and does not require large capital outlays, it fits the Indian and Mexican
economies quite well .
Many authors are concerned that educational conditions in developing coun-
tries such as the Caribbean would not allow the transition from resource-intensive
production to knowledge-based . production in the near future . However, the most
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important aspect of knowledge-intensive forms of development, as far as this
chapter is concerned, is its low impact on the environment. Knowledge-intensive
growth is not only more successful in pure economic terms, it is also more com-
patible with a sustainable global environment . Recent empirical work at the Inter-
American Development Bank in Washington, D.C ., belies this view for the Carib-
bean region as well . Harris (1994) established that the initial conditions found in
Caribbean countries ao years ago, in terms of education and the general satis-
faction of basic needs, matched those of the East Asian economies at the same pe-
riod . Since then, the East Asian countries have moved rapidly toward technology-
intensive practices with success. The Caribbean countries, and indeed the whole of
Latin America, instead emphasized resource-intensive growth, losing ground .
Today, Barbados is redressing this policy and attempting to make a swift transition
toward an information age society (Fidler 1995) . Mexico and India have active and
outward-oriented computer hardware and software sectors.
Some say that the loss of biodiversity might be slowed for a while in countries
following the path of the Asian Tigers, but eventual development-including high-
class housing, more cars, and roads-may renew the threats to biodiversity while
increasing other types of environmental degradation. This is not a foregone con-
clusion, however. Knowledge-intensive growth need not degenerate into resource-
intensive growth . The idea that it must misses an essential point in the argument.
Knowledge-intensive growth, if it occurs, is less dependent on resources than
resource-intensive growth-initially and forever.
Indeed, the industries that use knowledge most intensively need never revert to
resource-intensive production . The information revolution has led to forms of
communication and production that decrease, in absolute terms, the need for
roads and cars . Computers and communication networks have decreased the need
to travel to a workplace. Heating and power managed by computerized systems is
more efficient in the use of fuels . Tile products as well as the processes of the in-
formation society are much less intensive in the use of the atmosphere as a sink for
emissions than is the industrial society, and of many other resources. The only re-
source whose demand has increased in recent years in industrial societies is paper,
mostly clue to the low price of trees for wood pulp.
Can the Asian Model Be Generalized?
The answer is "yes ." The whole world can become knowledge intensive. There are
certainly skeptics to this view, and until it happens, this point cannot be proven .
Ilut a simple analogy explains how this can, and potentially will, happen.
In the last loo years, the nations of the North shifted to industrial societies. At
the beginning of this process, large parts of their economies were related to tile
agricultural sector, directly or indirectly. At that point, it would have seemed im-
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possible that the agricultural sector would shrink simultaneously in all of them.
But it happened . Today, for instance, the United States has at most 2.5 percent of its
Gvr in the agricultural sector, and most Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OFCD) nati6ns have similar proportions . The same process is
occurring throughout the South today.
Where will all the food come from when the process of industrialization is com-
pleted in the whole world? Can the whole world turn into an industrial society?
The answer is "yes, it can ." Industrial societies will keep producing food . In fact,
they produce even more food today than agricultural societies because they are
much more efficient at it . Currently, the industrial countries of the oEC;n have a
more or less permanent surplus of food, while the agricultural societies of the
South have deficits . Art industrial world need not have a food deficit . The problem
with industrial countries is not lack of food ; it is, as already discussed, overex-
ploitation of the global environment.
The same argument can be used to understand the transformation process of
industrial societies into knowledge-based society that will take place in the next
few decades. Ultimately, time will tell .
In any case, there is no reason to believe that the South must follow the North's
process of industrialization . The whole point of this chapter is to recommend that
it should not . The South should move directly from an agricultural society to a
knowledge-intensive society. Examples of agricultural societies that have bypassed
heavy industry abound . The area surrounding Chicago is one; a wheat and beef
economy Avis turned into financial products and services . Other exam1)les include
India, which is becoming a major software exporter, and Barbados, which intends
to become an information society within a generation .
NAFTA, EU, and WTO
External economies of scale can also play a positive role in reconciling potential
conflicts between regional trade agreements (such as file North American Free
Trade Agreement [NAFFA] and the European Union Iruj), and the liberalization of
world trade (tile World Trade Organization [wTro], formerly the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade [GATT- ]) (Chichilnisky 1992) .
These conflicts can be summarized as follows: a region with more market power
has generally more incentives to raise tariffs on outsiders, because it is in a better
position to win a "trade war." This means that a regional trading block such as
NAFTA would typically conspire against the overall liberalization of the world's
trade.
Yet this traditional proposition breaks down with external economies of scale,
which take the wind out of the protect ionists' sail (Chichilnisky 1992) . This hap-
pens because anything that restricts trade, such as tariffs, also decreases efficiency
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and increases domestic costs of production when there are ecoilonlies of scale .
Therefore, a major incentive to raise tariff barriers is gone.
It is widely believed that the main rationale for the formation of the ru was the
exploitation of economies of scale among European countries : the fact that each
producer could be more efficient when producing for the whole European market
than when planning production for their smaller, domestic market. Yet none of
this has permeated the logic of NAFTA, Which is solidly based, instead, on tradi-
tional comparative advantages .
The complete mobility of labor in the ev is a clear indication : it demonstrates
that the r.u trading block does not see its gains in trade of labor-intensive goods
from labor-rich countries, such as Portugal, against capital-intensive goods frorll
capital-rich countries, such as Germany. In contrast, NAFTA does, and again, tile
lack of mobility of labor within NAFTA is an indication of this fact .
Another negative aspect of regional trade blocks is that they can induce diver-
sion of trade, which means that they may lead a country to purchase from a
higher-cost producer within the region, rather than from a more efficient, lower-
cost producer outside the region . This occurs simply because the outsiders have
tariffs oil their products, which makes there appear less competitive .
However, economies of scale can also defeat this problem . The higher-cost pro-
ducer within the region may be so because it produced for a small market, and did
not benefit front economies of scale : by offering an opportunity to produce in
larger scale for the whole region, the regional trade block may change matters . The
high-cost producer can turn into an efficient, low-cost producer. If so, there is no
trade diversion .
Conclusion
Biodiversity cannot be seen in isolation . It is inextricably connected with eco-
nonlic development, as most biodiversity destruction arises frorll the loss of habi-
tat for economic purposes . A move awa}- from patterns of development and North-
South trade based oil resource-intensive traditional comparative advantages toward
knowledge-intensive patterns of trade and growth is essential . Resource-intensive
growth has shown itself to be unsuccessful during the last Zo years, and threatens
to destroy our global environment .
Economic growth and trade based on external economies of scale, and on
knowledge-intensive products, his proven itself successful in the East Asian
economies during the last 20 rears, and is more consistent with the environment .
Our international organizations (the imF, ws, and w -ro) must evolve to regard
knowledge-intensive patterns as a major goal of development .
Biodiversity is hostage to our backward mentality about economic develop-
illent . Only a fundamental and swift change in our vision, and corresponding
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changes in our practice of development and trade, can ensure the survival of the
planet's remaining biodiversity.
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Notes
1
	
For this purpose, 1 introduced and elaborated the idea of development based on the satisfaction of
basic needs (Chichilnisky 1977a,19776, 1982) within the context of the Bariloche global model (I ler-
rera, Scolnik, and Chichilnisky 1976), which provided an empirical examination of patterns of trade
and development in five continents that could be consistent with environmental preservation . The
concept of basic need recently became a cornerstone of the definition of sustainability in the
Brundtland Report .
z The United States has about z percent of all the world's known recoverable oil deposits (war 1994),
while Mexico's resources are expected to be exhausted early in the corning century (( .'lricliilnisky
and Ileal 1993) .
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